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Method of test administration as a factor in test validity: the use of 
a personality questionnaire in the prediction of cancer and 
coronary heart disease 
 




The validity of personality inventories has always presented considerable problems, as we are 
usually dealing with hypothetical constructs, rather than intervening variables (Cronbach and 
Meehl, 1955). Intervening variables are directly observable and reducible to empirical laws, while 
hypothetical constructs refer to processes or entities that are not directly observed (Garber & 
Strassberg, 1991 ). A construct, according to Cronbach and Meehl (1955), is defined as "'some 
postulated attribute of people, assumed to be reflected in test performance" (p. 283). The 
difficulty with such constructs is that they are basically unobservable and can only be measured 
indirectly. "Their existence is inferred through the relations between variables that can be 
observed and the performance on the tests that presumably measure the hypothesized entity" 
(Garber & Strassberg, 1991, p. 220). Examples of hypothetical constructs are traits, types, 
attributes, or any quality that cannot easily be operationally defined. 
 
There are four types of validity recognized by Cronbach and Meehl (1955), namely content, 
concurrent, predictive and construct validity; of those, Loewinger (1957) argued, the first three 
are essentially ad hoc, and "'construct validity is the whole of validity from a scientific point of 
view" (p. 636). However that may be, construct validity is necessary "where verifying operations 
against which to check tests are not automatically available" (Campbell, 1960, p. 550). Construct 
validity implies the existence of a nomological network which is defined as an interlocking system 
of lawful relations that comprise a theory, and this network consists of both theoretical constructs 
and observable properties or operations. It is assumed that the theoretical constructs are 
expressed fully in the questionnaire used to measure the construct in question, and that 
validation consists in deriving deductions from the theory which are empirically testable. This 
simple relationship may require some important qualifications. We have chosen for discussion 
and experimental investigation the concepts of cancer-prone and coronary heart disease (CHD)-
prone personalities (Eysenck, 1991), which have become the focus of much interest and numerous 
empirical investigations in recent years. 
 
Briefly, theory states that some people are more likely than others to contract and die of cancer, 
while others are more likely to die of CHD. The theory of "Type A personality" as developed by 
Friedman and Rosenman characterizes the CHD-prone person in such terms as aggressive, 
hostile, angry, as contrasted with the more normal, healthy "Type B personality" (Eysenck, 
1990a). The cancer-prone type (Type C--Temoshok & Dreher, 1992) has been defined in terms of 
such features as suppression of emotions and inability to cope with stress, leading to feelings of 
hopelessness, helplessness, and finally, depression (Eysenck, 1991).  Questionnaires to measure 
these hypothetical personality types have been constructed (e.g. Jenkins, Zyzanski, Ryan, Flessas 
2& Tannenbaum, 1977; Eysenck & Fulker, 1983, for CHD; Grossarth-Maticek & Eysenck, 1990, for 
cancer). There are two ways of providing construct validity, namely (1) demonstrating that 
probands high on Type C are diagnosed as suffering from cancer, while probands high on Type A 
are diagnosed as suffering from coronary heart disease, more frequently than vice versa, and that 
probands of Type B are found to be healthy. This method has often been used successfully, but of 
course suffers from the obvious criticism that the questionnaire response may be in part a 
function of the illness in question. 
 
(2) More convincing are studies involving healthy probands, tested and followed up for periods 
of 10 years or more: theory predicts that probands of Type A should die preponderantly of CHD, 
probands of Type C of cancer, with probands of Type B surviving longer than Type A or Type C 
probands. There is a good deal of evidence that large-scale findings support the theoretical 
predictions (Eysenck, 1991; Temoshok & Dreher, 1992). However, the usual argument implies 
that predictive qualities are inherent in the questionnaire, irrespective of method of 
administration, and the inevitable subjective reactions of the testee to the whole situation of being 
asked intimate questions, the purpose of which may not be at all clear to him or her. Thus 
Amelang and Schrnidt-Rathjens (1992) have published a study using a modified form of the 
Grossarth-Maticek and Eysenck (1990) inventory, but using a method of simply handing out the 
questionnaires to probands, whereas in the Grossarth-Maticek studies questionnaires were 
administered by carefully trained interviewers. Amelang and Sehmidt-Rathjens (1992) did find 
that sufferers from CHD and cancer had higher scores on Type A and Type C inventories, but 
failed to discover differences between cancer and CHD patients. This failure may be due to 
differences in method of administration, and in a previous study, Grossarth-Maticek, Eysenck 
and Barrett (1993) have shown that this is the most likely explanation. In this first study we have 
tested the hypothesis that different methods of administering a questionnaire produce 
differential approximations to truthful admission of undesirable personality traits and 
behaviours. Four different methods of administration produced different levels of trust and 
understanding, using the current prediction for healthy Ss of death by cancer or CHD 13 years 
later as the criterion. There were significant differences in the accuracy of the predictions, 
depending crucially on the method of administration of the questionnaires. Best predictions were 
achieved for Ss when both trust and understanding had been increased by interviewers’ suitable 
participation: worst results were achieved for Ss when no special effort was made to increase 
either. Intermediate results were found for procedures which increased either trust or 
understanding. It is argued that the success or failure of studies investigating the influence of 
personality and stress on diseases like cancer and coronary heart disease may depend crucially 
on the adopted method of interrogation. 
 
This conclusion may be of general importance in psychometric personality testing, and it seems 
appropriate to test our conclusion again in a study based on an altogether larger population. It is 
very possible that results may depend to some extent on the nature of the questionnaire, and the 
complexity of the questions. The more intimate the question, the greater the need for trust. The 
more complex the questions, the greater the need for understanding their meaning. The 
Grossarth-Maticek questions are both very intimate and very complex, in order to do justice to a 
theory that is inherently complex; hence they may be particularly in need of interviewer 
administration. But a similar relationship has been found for the Friedman-Rosenman Type A 
Type B inventories, where structured interview results have been far more predictive 
than questionnaire results (Eysenck, 1990a). Personal interaction seems likely to elicit more 
honest answers, although simple questions dealing with matters not too closely touching upon 
3the testee's emotional problems may not be subject to this effect to the same extent. It is worth 
noting, however, that even simple questions concerning smoking habits elicit a sufficiently large 
number of factually inaccurate answers to make the results useless for the study of the alleged 
'passive smoking' effects on health (Lee, 1988). 
 
The aim of the study, then, is to provide additional information on the effects of inventory 
administration on response accuracy, using as our criterion the relative success of prediction of 
death from cancer or coronary heart disease. We shall also report on the possibility of improving 
the questionnaires used in such a way that they can be used without such interviewer 
assistance. Clearly interviewer administration is costly and time-consuming, and if it can be 




The questionnaire used has been described elsewhere (Grossarth-Maticek et al., 1990). It consists 
of 71 questions (one of these has been left out of the English version of this German inventory to 
keep numbers in sub-scales even), designed to measure 6 variables: (1) Type 1, or the cancer-
prone personality: (2) Type 2, or the CHD-prone personality: (3) Type 3, a hysterical type of 
personality: (4) Type 4, an autonomous, healthy type of personality: (5) Type 5, described 
as rational-antiemotional: (6) Type 6, an antisocial, psychopathic type of personality. The 
psychometric properties of these scales have been found satisfactory, (e.g. Schmitz, 1992: van der 
Ploeg, Kleijn, Mooks, Van Hunge Pieters & Leer, 1989), and factor analysis suggests that it might 
be meaningful to use a formula (1 + 2 + 5)-(3 + 4 + 6) to identify probands likely to succumb to 
illness generally (Grossarth-Maticek et al., 1993). Scores on scales 1, 2 and 5 correlate and 
have consistently been associated with illness: scores on scales 3, 4 and 6 correlate negatively 
with 1, 2 and 5, and predict lack of illness. 
 
Four groups form the major part of the experiment. Each consisted of 1150 persons aged from 40 
to 68: subjects were consigned randomly to the group, with the sexes equally distributed. Subjects 
were originally chosen from electoral lists: refusal rates were around 23%. We started with 
altogether 4600 Ss, of whom 3563 were tested in 1973, and followed up at the end of 1988, i.e. a I5-
yr follow-up study, with death certificates as the criteria of mortality and cause of death. The 
groups are differentiated in terms of the method of questionnaire administration followed. 
 
To begin with, in Group 1 Ss had explained to them the purpose of the investigation, i.e., that the 
questions were concerned with an understanding of psychosocial factors in relation to health and 
illness. Subjects then gave informed consent to being tested, and were promised to be given 
results if they so wished. They were then asked to talk for 30 min about their lives, with special 
reference to particularly agreeable or disagreeable events. They were encouraged to talk about 
their typical reactions and behaviour in stressful situations. Next, the interviewer read the 
questions out and asked for answers. A standard explanation was associated with each question. 
The interviewer asked after each answer whether the question had been understood, and only if 
it had been answered properly was the answer accepted. If the interviewer felt that the question 
had not been answered in line with the explained meaning of the question, he/she repeated the 
question and the explanation, asking for a reconsideration. Usually it was possible to obtain a 
clear-cut and meaningful answer to the question after such intervention. Thus this method was 
designed to produce trust and understanding. 
4In Group 2 the 30-min talk at the beginning was left out, and we only have the explanatory 
interaction. In Group 3 there was no explanation of the questions, only the introduction 
concerning the purpose of the study and the nature of the 6 types. There was no discussion about 
positive and negative life events, but an effort was made to produce a positive reaction between 
interviewer and subject, and to arouse a general interest in the investigation. Finally for Group 4 
there was only the presentation of the questionnaire, with the explanation of why we were 
carrying out the study. It was explained that no further information could be given, to preserve 
the objectivity of the study. 
 
Group 1 incorporates the usual procedures adopted in the various studies reported by Grossarth-
Maticek; it embodies the elements of interviewer-subject relations we consider important in 
eliciting trust responses. Type 4 incorporates the usual procedures adopted in most 
questionnaire-type investigations. The difference is very marked, and on simple psychological 
grounds alone, it seems likely that Group 1 will give better results than Group 4, with Group 2 




Table 1 shows the numbers of Ss in the four groups, and belonging to each of the 6 types. Also 
shown are the numbers and proportions of individuals in each group who had died of cancer or 
CHD (infarct). The number of participants in Group 4 is the lowest because a higher proportion 
of refusals occurred in that group, not perhaps unexpectedly. The other 3 groups had a much 
lower proportion of refusals.  
 
Table 2 gives the percentage values for those who died of cancer in the four groups, and of the 6 
types. X2 values for 3 df for each Type score show that for Type 1 and Type 4 Group 1 clearly 
produces the best prediction, with Type 1 having the highest, Type 4 the lowest cancer mortality 
(P < 0.001). Type 6, predicted to have low cancer mortality, also falls in line with P < 0.01. For the 
other Types results are non-significant. (Here as elsewhere Yates' correction has been used when 
applicable.) 
 
5Table 3 gives results for infarct mortality. Results for Type 2 (P < 0.05), Type 4 (P < 0.001) and 
Type 6 (P < 0.01) are significant, in the expected direction. For Cancer and CHD combined, not 
shown in a separate table, Type 1 was significant (P < 0.01), Type 4 was significant (P < 0.001), and 
Type 6 was significant (P < 0.001). 
 
These analyses were complicated since the number of Ss differed across each Group and Type. 
Analyses were conducted on the raw scores adjusted to standard raw scores in each instance so 
that direct, legitimate comparisons could be made. (It is of course not legitimate to undertake X 2
analyses on percentage scores, but these are given to facilitate appreciation of the trend of the 
data.) 
 
We now turn to an analysis of the summed Type scores, Ill (1 + 2 + 5) and Well (3 + 4 + 6). Table 4 
gives results for cancer mortality. Groups 1 and 2 produce significance levels of P < 0.0001 and P
< 0.001, but groups 3 and 4 fail to show significance. Table 5 gives the values for CHD, with 
similar results--P < 0.001 and P < 0.01, Group 3 and 4 NS. The values for cancer and CHD 
combined, not shown separated, are similar. 
 
Overall, Type 4 (the healthy, autonomous type) seems to give the best prediction of mortality-
survival. X 2 values were calculated for cancer, contrasting Type 4 with Types l + 2 + 3 + 5 + 6, and 
for CHD, also contrasting Type 4 with the rest. In both cases P values of < 0.001 were found for 
Group l and Group 2, but nothing significant for Group 3 and 4. Combining Cancer and CHD 
gave values of P < 0.0001 and P < 0.001 for Groups 1 and 2, NS for Group 3 and 4. 
 
6We may now turn to look at the validity of our criterion for evaluating the procedures used by 
the 4 Groups. Hypothesis 1 (H1) states that Type l predicts cancer mortality better than all other 
personality types. Out of 786 Type 1 Ss, 134 died of cancer, i.e. 17%. Of the other types, 231 died 
of cancer, out of 2777, i.e. 8.3%. X2 with one df = 23.62, P < 0.001. H1 is supported. 
 
H2 states that Type 2 predicts CHD mortality significantly more often than all the other 
personality types. Out of 766 Type 2 Ss, 79 died from CHD, i.e. 10.3%. Out of 2797 other Types, 
119 died from CHD, i.e. 4.3%, giving a X2 value of 19.29, P < 0.001. H2 is supported. H3 states that 
Type 1 predicts cancer death significantly more often than does Type 2. Of Type 1 Ss, 134 out of 
786 Ss died of cancer, i.e. 17%. Out of 766 Type 2 Ss, only 65 died of cancer, i.e. 8.5%, X2 = 22.00, 
P < 0.001. H3 is supported. H4 states that Type 2 predicts CHD better than Type 1. Out of 766 Type 
2 Ss, 79 died of CHD, i.e. 10.3%. But out of 786 Type l Ss, only 36 died of CHD, i.e. 4.6%. X2 =
16.89, P < 0.001. H4 is supported. And finally, H5 states that Types (3 + 4 + 6) are significantly less 
likely to die from cancer or CHD than Types (1 + 2 + 5). Of 1361 Types (3 + 4 + 6), 149 died of 
cancer or CHD, i.e. 10.9%. But of Types (1 + 2 + 5), 414 died from cancer or CHD, out of 2202 Ss, 




It will be clear that our results on the whole bear out the general theory they were meant to test. 
The research was premised on the hypotheses numbered 1 to 5, namely that (H1) Type 1 would 
predict cancer, (H2) Type 2 would predict CHD, (H3) Type 1 would predict cancer better than 
Type 2, (H4) Type 2 would predict CHD better than Type 1, and (H5) that Types 3 + 4 + 6 would 
die less frequently from cancer or CHD than Types 1 + 2 + 5. All 5 hypotheses were supported at 
the p < 0.001 level, and are hence suitable to form the criterion against which to test our 
hypothesis that method of data collection would significantly affect validity of findings.
It is clear that Group I (explanation plus trust) does better than the other Groups, while Group 4 
(neither) does worst. This is in line with prediction. Groups 2 and 3 are between Groups 1 and 4; 
this too is in line with prediction. No prediction was made as to the relative performance of 
Groups 2 and 3. It is evident that Group 2 (explanation) does better than Group 3 (trust); indeed, 
Group 3 performs only marginally better than Group 4. As an example, consider the differences 
between Ill (1 + 2 + 5) and Well (3 + 4 + 6) Ss, derived from Table 4. Details are given in Table 6. 
Clearly, explanation was more important than trust in producing veridical predictions, although 
of course the combination seems to have synergistic properties. If we simply add the effects of 
explanation (Group 2) and trust (Group 3), we get figures below those achieved by Group 1, 
where explanation and trust were combined in the method of administration. Thus for cancer the 
figures are 20.3 vs 9.8; for CHD, 9.3 vs 5.6, and for both combined 29.7 vs 15.5. Thus trust and 
explanation condition seem to interact synergistically, i.e. their effects multiply rather than add. 
This is an important finding. Of course these figures cannot necessarily be extrapolated to other 
questionnaires, which might have less complex wording. Much research remains to be done 
along these lines to discover the general laws linking properties of the questionnaire and 
properties of administration procedure. 
 
8It will have been noted that for Group 4 results are actually negative, i.e. the "ill" Ss (Types 1 + 2 + 
5) actually have less cancer and CHD than the "well" Ss (Types 3 + 4 + 6). This is in line with the 
theory that it is suppression of emotion that is mainly responsible for cancer and CHD. This 
hypothesis was first tested by Kissen and Eysenck (1962), who found that as predicted cancer 
patients had significantly lower scores on a neuroticism questionnaire than patients with benign 
growths. Many other studies have since replicated this finding (Eysenck, 1985). The negative 
relationship between the Types 1 + 2 + 5 combination and illness is well in line with this view. 
Presumably the procedures used in Groups 1, 2 and 3 overcome to varying degree the 
suppressive proclivities of cancer-prone and CHD-prone Ss, and succeed in turning negative 
into positive values in Table 6. This is another important area of research. We need to classify the 
conditions under which disease-prone Ss suppress the verbal expression of their emotions, as 
opposed to verbalizing them (Eysenck, 1991). Many negative findings may be due to a failure to 
use appropriate methods of investigation; clearly contrary results may seem to appear from 




Few experimenters in a field like epidemiology that requires large follow-up groups can afford 
the expensive use of interviewer-administered testing procedures that produced such good 
results in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 was conducted to investigate the possibility of obtaining 
reasonably good results with a procedure that would be less expensive in interviewer time. In 
this experiment, (1) we used a new set of questionnaires written specially to be easier to 
understand, (2) we dispensed with the trust-creating interaction part, and (3) minimized the 
explanation aspect by only offering explanation when asked specifically. This study also used a 
random sample, half male, half female; 1800 persons, aged between 40 and 67, were approached 
by letter, and 1569 agreed to fill in the questionnaires. The study began in 1976-1978, 
so that we have a 10-year follow-up, i.e. 5 yr shorter than the follow-up in Experiment 1. 
 
Four questionnaires were used, the first of which gave the Ss scores for the 6 Grossarth-Maticek 
types, as in Experiment 1. The second asked questions about self-regulation, an extended list of 
questions using the concept of autonomous behaviour basic for Type 4. The third questionnaire 
9related to contentment, while the fourth contained additional questions to differentiate Type 1 
from Type 2. None of these have been published, but publication is due in the near future. 
 
The method of administration was as follows. In the introduction, the interviewer explained the 
aim of the study. Next, the questionnaire was read out to the S who was asked to explain his 
reasons for giving a specific answer. Only when the question was obviously misunderstood 
would the interviewer repeat the question and ask for a new explanation of the S's answer. The 
results of the study are shown in Table 7. 
 
Clearly Type 1 is linked with cancer, Type 2 with CHD, with the former link again much 
stronger. Type 5, too, is linked with cancer, less so with CHD, while Types 4 and 6 show no 
difference. Statistics have been worked out as before for the "ill" and "'well" combination of Types 
1 + 2 + 5 vs Types 3 + 4 + 6. For cancer the percentages are 14.1 vs 1.7%, P < 0.001, and for CHD 
they are 6.1 vs. 1.4%, P < 0.001. Again results are significant in the predicted direction, and again 
the figures for cancer are much better than for CHD. X 2 for cancer is 83.06, for CHD it is 25.03, 
with 1 df. 
The figures for Type 4, contrasting this with the sum of the other 5 Types, is 1.5 vs 9.6% for 
cancer, and 1.2 vs. 4.1% for CHD, both with P < 0.001. Clearly, it is possible to obtain good results 
even with a somewhat curtailed methodology, although of course even this curtailed 




Many commentators have remarked on the contradictory results often reported in the literature 
concerned with the effects of psychosocial factors (stress, personality) on cancer and CHD. This 
and the preceding study (Grossarth-Maticek et al., 1993), as well as the experience of Type A-
Type B investigators (Eysenck, 1990a) of the superiority of using a structured interview rather 
than simply handing out questionnaires, suggest that one important variable leading to disparate 
results may be the method of data collection. Motivation, general attitude, awareness of the 
purpose of the study, understanding of the questions, and personal involvement--these may be 
crucial in determining the answers a person will give to questions that touch upon very sensitive, 
often painful, always very personal aspects of his behaviour. It is naive to disregard these 
factors and imagine that truthful answers will always be given even when no measures are taken 
to ensure co-operation, trust and understanding of the questions. The practice of using students 
as subjects may have had a strong influence here; students are more likely than ordinary people 
to appreciate the purpose of a scientific study, to agree with the need for such studies, and to 
understand the questions properly. Nothing of the kind can be presumed in non-student 
populations, and the very frequent misunderstandings of questions reported by our interviewers 
is eloquent testimony to such needs. The Schmale and Iker (1971) study is eloquent witness to the 
need for appropriate methodology and instruments in this field; they succeeded in verifying their 
theory that hopelessness was a valid prediction of cancer when they used an appropriate 
structured interview, but failed dismally (using the same subjects) when they used the MMPI and 
the Rorschach (Eysenck, 1990b). Measurement in epidemiology needs to be informed on 
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